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ABSTRACT 
Support of a soccer club has become a cultural cornerstone for a 
significant portion of European society, yet a major portion of the German 
population has been denied this opportunity to root for a home team or even a 
local player. The cultural significance of soccer in the region may also have helped 
fuel societal divisions that extend beyond the boundaries of the soccer pitch, such that 
the absence of representation may have played at least a small role in the unhappiness 
with the current political and cultural environment in the former GDR. If those in the 
East feel that their identity was compromised after unification, and it seems likely that 
on the soccer pitch it was, it may have played some part in the return of identity 
politics and the populist nationalist sentiments there. As the security situation in 
Europe today continues to become more concerning, the lessons of 1789, 1848, and 
1932 warrant the resolution of any issue that could even be loosely connected to the 
explosion of nationalism—and other divisive particularisms—in the region. 
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The unification of Germany in 1990 brought the former Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) together under a common 
Federal German flag without the socialist hammer and compass. The Europe of a quarter 
century later seems bent on renationalization, despite the high hopes of the European 
Union, in which a united Germany has been a driver of multinational progress in 
security between East and West. How can an American student of European security make 
sense of this epochal shift of citizenship, nationhood, and security in light of the 
ongoing U.S.-European defense bond threatened by an integral nationalist challenge of 
special viciousness? 
One place to begin to answer this question lies in the depths of national feeling and 
regional belonging via society and culture that is central to modern Germany—and 
especially to Germany since 1990. This common German identity has not translated to 
equal representation in one of Germany’s signature sports, football (soccer). Indeed, clubs 
and players from the former FRG have dominated the Bundesliga1 and the German 
National Team, leaving clubs and players from the former GDR behind. In a country with 
such a storied past and proud identification with its football identity, how has this disparity 
contributed to continued social divisions within Germany? Have any policies implemented 
by the divided governments of the FRG or GDR facilitated this enduring inconsistency?  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Soccer occupies a significant, relevant status as the king of German popular 
sporting culture. Indeed, the Bundesliga enjoys continuing success, breaking its own 
attendance record in the 2016–2017 season.2 As soccer is the most popular sport in the 
nation, it would be reasonable to predict somewhat uniform distribution of premier clubs 
                                                 
1 The Bundesliga is the name for Germany’s club (national) soccer league. 
2 “German Football Sets New Attendance Record,” Bundesliga: Official website, June 23, 2017, 
Accessed October 19, 2017 http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/german-football-sets-new-
attendance-record-bundesliga-447231.jsp.  
2 
and players from locales across the country. However, in the quarter-century-plus 
following unification, only five teams from the former GDR have gained promotion to 
the Bundesliga’s top tier.3 In fact, there was a complete lack of representation from the 
East from 2009 until 2016, when RB Leipzig acceded to the first division.4 The situation 
is much the same for the German national team; both the 2014 World Cup-winning lineup 
and the 2018 squad that crashed out in the group stage featured just one player from the 
former GDR.  
This Western domination has not always been the case, as evidenced by the year 
1974—perhaps the heyday of soccer in the GDR.5 During that year’s European club 
campaign, FC Magdeburg won the European Cup as the best club in all of Europe and the 
GDR’s national team defeated the FRG 1–0 on the game’s biggest stage during the FIFA 
World Cup’s group stage. 
The fact that this disparity has persisted beyond the initial years of unification 
makes it worthy of further examination. This divide between East and West exists not only 
on the soccer pitch, but in other realms of daily life as well. In a 2015 study, Gideon Becker 
observed a “quite substantial” wealth gap between East and West Germans.6 Politically, 
the most recent elections saw the state of Saxony delivery a majority vote for the far-right 
Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party.7 No other region in the country provided this 
                                                 
3 Glen Moutrie, “West German Teams Still Dominate the East in the Bundesliga,” The Guardian, 
October 17, 2014, Accessed October 19, 2017 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/17/west-german-teams-still-dominate-the-east-in-
the-bundesliga. 
4 “Renaissance in Eastern Germany: Leipzig, Dresden and Aue on the Up,” Bundesliga: Official 
website, June 24, 2016, Accessed October 19, 2017 
http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/noblsp-renaissance-in-eastern-germany-leipzig-dresden-
and-Aue.jsp. 
5 “Eastern German Soccer Clubs Struggle to Stay in the Game,” Deutsche Welle, September 5, 2010, 
Accessed October 19, 2017 http://www.dw.com/en/eastern-german-soccer-clubs-struggle-to-stay-in-the-
game/a-5967469. 
6 Gideon Becker, “Econometric Analysis of the Wealth Gap between East and West Germany,” 
University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, no. 87: 37, http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-656979. 
7 Elizabeth Schumacher, “German Election Results: Disappointing Victory for Angela Merkel as Cdu 




level of support for the party, providing another data point for the divisions which remain 
part of German society. The study of the lack of unity on the soccer pitch sheds some light 
on the underlying conditions which help Germany’s social divisions to endure today. 
Support of a soccer club has become a cultural cornerstone for a significant portion 
of European society, yet a major portion of the German population have been denied this 
opportunity to root for a home team or even a local player. The cultural significance of 
soccer in the region has helped fuel societal divisions which extend beyond the boundaries 
of the soccer pitch, such that the absence of representation likely plays at least a small role 
in the unhappiness with the current political and cultural environment in the former GDR. 
Many in the East feel that their identity was compromised after unification, and on the 
soccer pitch it has been, fueling in some part in the return of identity politics and the 
populist nationalist sentiments there. As the security situation in Europe today continues to 
become more concerning, the lessons of 1789, 1848, and 1932 warrant the study of any 
issue that could even be loosely connected to the explosion of nationalism—and other 
divisive particularisms—in the region. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In theory, soccer is nothing more than a matchup of 22 players divided evenly 
among two squads, both attempting to deposit a ball in the opposing team’s net more often 
than they concede the same act. The impact of the game, however, is not contained to the 
pitch or even within the walls of stadia across the globe. Indeed, its unrivaled popularity 
worldwide has ensured that the games impact bleeds beyond merely social events into the 
political and economic realms of the modern world. Simon Kuper, an award-winning 
author who has described the game’s impact on economics and politics, declares, “when a 
game matters to billions of people it ceases to be just a game. Football is never just football: 
it helps make wars and revolutions, and it fascinates mafias and dictators.”8 Jim Riordan 
and Arnd Krüger state that “the growing internationalization and politicization of sport 
                                                 
8 Simon Kuper, Football against the Enemy (London: Orion), 1. 
4 
inevitably drew in broader issues, like religion, social class, women, and race.”9 In 
particular, they claim that the ideological enemies of the Cold War era believed that athletic 
superiority would lead at least in some small way to ideological victory.  
Germany, as a majority of nations have done, has historically also placed great 
emphasis on international sporting success. Before the nation came to dominate on the 
soccer pitch, gymnastics was the preferred avenue of proving athletic superiority. Heinrich 
notes the immense power the gymnastic association, the Tunerschaft, held in the German 
social and political spheres in the early 20th century.10 Udo Merkel describes an opposing 
viewpoint from the same era: “there was no coherent and specific set of patriotic and 
national ideas associated with sport as it was simply perceived as an unhealthy leisure 
activity without positive virtues and fostering only specialization, exaggerated selfishness, 
competitiveness and the principle of individual achievement. The narrow and focused 
training of athletes and the emerging commercialization and professionalization in English 
football grounds and boxing rings were also criticized.”11  
However, this opposition to sport remained a minority, and the sporting landscape 
was quickly politicized. Hitler’s National Socialist regime worked quickly to enact 
nationalist regulations on sport and particularly soccer.12 Yet by attempting to turn football 
into a political event, the Nazi regime began to lose the support of fans who sought the 
sport out as a temporary escape from the totalitarian state’s politics. Shortly after coming 
into power, the Nazis implemented policies which “meant the immediate end of 
independent working-class organizations, social-democratic and communist football clubs 
and two years later the abolition of religious football organizations.”13 This may have been 
the first attempt to manipulate the identifying characteristics of German soccer clubs, but 
                                                 
9 James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century (New York: 
Routledge), x. 
10 Arthur Heinrich, “The 1954 Soccer World Cup and the Federal Republic of Germany’s Self-
Discovery,” The American Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 11 (July 2003): 1491.  
11 Udo Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the German Football Association (Dfb), 
1900–50,” Soccer & Society 1, no. 2 (2000): 170, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14660970008721270. 
12 Heinrich, 1492. 
13 Merkel, 182. 
5 
it would not be the last. In this manipulation of identity, the Nazis—and later the 
socialists—made a grave mistake. As Gerry P. T. Finn notes: 
Many individuals express strong positive emotions towards ‘their’ own 
local community. Local football teams have for a long time represented 
and crystallized that sense of community, which has added to the 
emotional significance invested in the local football club. For some 
supporters, the football team has become the most substantial 
embodiment of the local community, with the affairs of the local club 
being seen as a crucial determinant of the vibrancy of the local 
community itself.14 
After coming to power in 1945, the Soviet-installed regime in the GDR 
implemented a policy which—similar to the restrictions put in place under Hitler—banned 
all private sports associations and clubs. The government simultaneously formed the 
German Football association, or Deutscher Fußballverband (DFV) as the regulating body 
for soccer in East Germany.15 Communist leadership intended to utilize sport to increase 
prestige, as Erich Mielke, the Minister of State Security (Stasi), remarked that domination 
by East Germany national teams and high profile clubs would “highlight even more clearly 
the superiority of our socialist order in the area of sport.”16 On the Olympic stage, the GDR 
was able to showcase this superiority, placing in the top three medal-winning countries in 
every Olympic Games from 1972 to 1988.17 The legitimacy of those victories is now 
widely questioned, as the release of documents following German unification revealed a 
widespread systematic program of doping undertaken by the East Germans.18 While 
                                                 
14 Gerry P. T. Finn, “Football Violence: A Societal Psychological Perspective,” in Football, Violence 
and Social Identity, ed. Richard Giulianotti, Norman Bonney, and Mike Hepworth (New York: Routledge), 
100–01. 
15 Mike Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” German Monitor 
71 (2009): 209, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/762997223?accou
ntid=12702. 
16 Dennis, 210. 
17 As a show of solidarity with the USSR, the GDR teams did not participate in the 1984 Olympic 
Games in Los Angeles. Source for medal counts: James Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,” in 
The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century, ed. James Riordan and Arnd Kruger (London: 
E&FN Spon, 1999), 58–59. 
18 Mike Dennis and Johnathan Grix, Sport under Communism: Behind the East German ‘Miracle’ 
(Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 84. 
6 
achieved through questionable methods, the impact of these athletic achievements should 
not be understated. Party Chairman Erich Honecker remarked that “our state is respected 
in the world because of the excellent performance of our top athletes, but also because we 
devote enormous attention to sport in an endeavor to make it part of the everyday lives of 
each and every citizen.”19 Statements from high-ranking state officials like this clearly 
demonstrate the emphasis on sport and the resulting political benefits of successful athletic 
campaigns. 
The political benefits of sport are not limited to those on the seat of government. 
Fans and athletes often find that attendance at sporting events provides a prime opportunity 
to voice displeasure with their political situation. Bill Buford, in studying fan violence in 
England, noted that, “it was obvious that the fan violence was a protest. It made sense that 
it would be: that football matches were providing an outlet for frustrations of a powerful 
nature. So many young people were out of work or had never been able to find any. The 
violence, it followed, was a rebellion of some kind—social rebellion, class rebellion…”20 
Similarly, in the GDR many fans began to turn to hooliganism and rioting as a means for 
voicing their displeasure with the socialist government. Especially in the 1980s—the 
waning decade of the failed socialist experiment—fans began to add their voices to the 
cacophony of discontent which was sweeping the Second World.21 Kuper defines this 
particular form of “football dissidence” as “expressing dissent against a regime by 
supporting football teams that play against the regime’s team. Often, in a dictatorship, 
football dissidence is the only available form of mass dissent. In a football stadium, 80,000 
people can gather and shout more or less what they like. It is easy to arrest the writer of a 
naughty article in a samizdat publication; harder to shut up a football crowd, which in any 
case has a louder voice.”22 
                                                 
19 Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,”“61. 
20 Bill Buford, Among the Thugs, 1st American ed. (New York: Norton), 15. 
21 Dennis, 209. 
22 Simon Kuper, “Cheering the Enemy,” Index on Censorship 29, no. 4: 79, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03064220008536767. 
7 
Although both the National Socialists and the GDR have been expunged from 
today’s Germany, the legacy of decades of interference and oppression have left soccer in 
a decrepit state in East Germany. The aforementioned representation gap in the top flight 
of the Bundesliga began immediately among reconciliation as only two teams from the 
now-defunct GDR were incorporated into the top tier during the Bundesliga’s first unified 
season, the 1991–1992 campaign.23 The DFB also missed a major opportunity to level the 
playing field, when after national embarrassment at the 2000 European Championships, 
the association undertook a now-famous ten year plan to rehabilitate the nation’s soccer 
arsenal.24 While the plan achieved its main aim and resulted in the German National Team 
lifting the World Cup champions trophy in Brazil in 2014, it incorporated no provisions 
aimed at revitalizing East Germany’s soccer academy system—a system which is the 
backbone of player development. Today, just eight of the thirty-six elite German soccer 
schools can be found in the former GDR.25 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The lack of quality in East German football is likely due to a combination of factors 
that have hindered the game’s development there. It does appear that the quality of clubs 
and players from the East prior to World War II point to a more level representation prior 
to the country’s division following the Third Reich’s defeat. The game’s demise began 
when the communist-led GDR attempted to control every aspect of the game—from 
regulating where players would be assigned to which team fans could and could not 
support. The regime removed the joy from the game for many of its subjects and for many 
former fans, attendance at football matches became more an opportunity to protest 
communism than to celebrate success on the pitch. 
 
                                                 
23 Bernd Frick and Joachim Prinz, “Crisis? What Crisis? Football in Germany,” Journal of Sports 
Economics 7, no. 1: 61,  
24 Raphael Honigstein, Das Reboot: How German Soccer Reinvented Itself and Conquered the World 
(New York: Nation Books), 13–26. 
25 “Eastern German Soccer Clubs Struggle to Stay in the Game.” 
8 
It would be lax to lay all of the blame of the state of today’s game in the East at the 
feet of Stasi Chief Erich Mielke and the DFV leadership who left a state of ruins behind. It 
also appears the DFB missed a major opportunity to develop the game after the 2000 
European Championship when the nation undertook a major operation to completely 
overhaul the nation’s talent development infrastructure. One generation of German 
footballers after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there remains a stark difference in football in 
the East and the West. As societal divisions continue to manifest themselves in everyday 
life throughout the country—not just in sport but also politics and economics—any issue 
which allows for continued divisiveness provides an avenue for the return of nationalist 
sentiments fueled by identity politics and fear-based “us versus them” arguments.26 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research supporting examination of this question is centered on examination of 
historical documents and statistics in order to unearth the underlying causes of the 
representation discrepancy in German football. In particular, sports policies adopted 
by the government of the former GDR have been considered. A discussion of broader 
economic and political divisions within the country nearly three decades after unification 
provides the foundational elements of social fractures which continue to be present on the 
soccer pitch. 
The divided years provide significant contributions to the analysis, as it was 
here that football’s popularity and quality so severely waned in East Germany. Policies 
implemented following the merging of the Oberliga and the Bundesliga are also discussed 
as they initially hampered a level playing field between teams from the East and West. 
Finally, the failed promotion of the game over the decades following unification 
provide an opportunity to analyze the continued social marginalization of the game’s fans 
in the East.  
 
                                                 
26 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications, Inc.), 20–22. 
9 
Evaluation of these broad time periods in concert may help to paint a causal picture 
as to what the underlying causes of today’s domination of German football representation 
by the former FRG and may point to necessary conditions which would facilitate a future 
closing of that gap by teams from the former GDR. Once these underlying causes are 
determined, a discussion of how the divisions on the football pitch fit into the larger  
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II. REUNITED IN NAME ONLY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
DIVISION IN GERMANY TODAY 
To Germans in the GDR, I can say what Prime Minister de Mazière 
has already emphasized: No one will be worse off than before—and 
many will be better off. Only the monetary, economic, and social union 
offers the chance, yes, even the guarantee, of improving living 
conditions rapidly and thoroughly. Through our joint efforts, we will 
soon succeed in transforming Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-
Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia into blooming landscapes 
where it is worthwhile to live and work.27 
—Helmut Kohl, July 1, 1990 
As unified Germany nears the end of its third decade of post-Cold War existence, 
some critical factors point to a nation that is united in name only. Significant social fissures 
remain between citizens residing in the former GDR and those inhabiting the former FRG. 
These divisions have played at least a small part in the recent return of right-wing 
nationalist parties to the German political landscape—a scene that has similarly played out 
across much of Europe. For example, the AfD—a German far-right party with an anti-EU, 
anti-immigrant platform—was able to gain an unprecedented level of support in Germany’s 
2017 nation-wide elections.28 Closer analysis reveals that the party was nearly twice as 
popular in the East, where it gained 20.5 percent of the vote, as it was in the West, where 
only 10.5 percent of citizens cast votes in favor of the party. In the region of Saxony alone, 
the party was able to garner nearly one-third of the total vote. These political rifts are 
indicative of the broader social divisions that continue to divide Germany today. This 
chapter examines the roots of the enduring invisible wall between East and West Germany 
and discuss the broad social divisions that the country is still grappling with—problems 
which are further exacerbated by feelings of East German inadequacy in other social areas 
including the realm of sport. 
                                                 
27 Helmut Kohl, “Blooming Landscapes,” German History in Documents and Images, July 1, 1990, 
Accessed March 11, 2018 http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3101. 
28 Schumacher. 
12 
A. FROM SOCIALIST AUTHORITARIANISM TO CAPITALIST 
DEMOCRACY 
Certainly, the reunification of divided Germany involved more than simply tearing 
down the Berlin Wall and proclaiming the two would become one again. Germany had 
been pitched in an ideological battle between West and East since the Allied forces 
converged there in the waning moments of World War II. Ultimately, it was the socialist 
government of the GDR that was forced to yield. Capitalism had overcome socialism. The 
FRG had scored an ideological victory. The capitulation of the socialism did not happen 
overnight, however, as four decades of Soviet-inspired living had firmly ensconced the 
socialist ideal in every aspect of everyday life within the GDR. Facing the haunting specter 
of a regression down Marx’s natural order of life and returning to capitalism from socialism 
instead of achieving the communist utopia was sure to cause a certain amount of discomfort 
among the true believers in Marx’s ideal.29 Convincing many citizens of the GDR that 
capitalism and a market economy were preferable took a significant amount of effort. 
Fortunately, many of the necessary reforms began prior to the collapse of the GDR.  
Such groups as Democracy Now and New Forum led the social organization of the 
GDR’s hopeful democratizers. The state’s newfound reluctance to quiet the voices of social 
reform allowed the hopeful citizens to gain the acceleration necessary to propel democracy 
from its inert state towards the terminal velocity it achieved on November 9, 1989. This 
monumental date marked the opening of checkpoints which restricted the flow of the 
people of Berlin between the Eastern and Western sides of the city. From this point 
forward, it seemed the reunification of Germany and the installation of a democratic 
government were almost inevitable. Along its path to democracy, and prior to the official 
reunification—which occurred on October 3, 1990—the GDR held its own elections. This 
March 1990 referendum would install the government which would direct the reunification 
efforts. In the end, the voices of the citizens ended up being a resounding denouncement 
of the communist cause, a chorus of change which would resonate throughout Eastern 
Europe. As Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen notes: 
                                                 
29 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” in The Political Economy Reader: 
Markets as Institutions, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge), 41–62. 
13 
The results were a blow to the Communist hold on power everywhere in 
revealing how narrow tis popular base had actually been despite all its 
assumptions and pretensions. The stark revelation of how small a 
minority had repressed the will of a vast majority shook the Communists 
clinging to the remnants of their authority and credibility in Europe. 
Wherever they faced free elections, the East German precedent sent 
shivers through them. Next in line was Hungary, where elections were 
scheduled for 25 March 1990, when a center-right party, the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, imitating the success of the Alliance for Germany, 
and other democratic forces buried Communism.30 
While the push for democracy was met with swift acceptance and implementation, 
the transition to capitalism would marked by much more significant challenges—some of 
which remain to this day. Four decades of division fueled an economic divide between the 
two Germanys which would not be destroyed by belief and bulldozers, as the physical 
barriers had been. In fact, the opening of the borders created an opportunity for a sort of 
German carpetbagger—as many from the West began to take advantage of the situation in 
the East in an attempt to fill their own coffers.31 It seems that unlike the political bridging, 
those on either side of the economic divide held to their long-held stereotypical views, as 
noted by Hämäläinen: 
The East Germans had lived in an authoritarian command system which 
had ingrained into them the habit of waiting for orders telling them what 
to do. Some were used to sliding by with less than a full effort in their 
daily jobs and doing their private errands during work hours. West 
Germans complained about the East Germans’ work habits, accusing 
them of keeping short hours, slowness and absenteeism. They also 
thought that the East Germans needed improvement in such traditional 
Germanic virtues as being reliable and punctual in their work. These 
complaints and accusations did not go down well with many East 
Germans who had a reputation in the former Soviet sphere of possessing 
the very qualities which they now were said to lack.32 
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Workers in the East received about one-third of the wages of their counterparts in 
the West did. They had also been stripped of the socialist assurance of a state-delivered 
pension. As the governments in Bonn and Berlin worked feverishly to enact policies to 
overcome the long-standing differences, uncertainty fanned the flames of fear in the 
hearts and minds of many in the East. The capitalist system brought a distinct sense of 
uncertainty on the individual level, as East Germans fretted over how “they would measure 
up to the free market demands of working pace, efficiency and production.”33 These 
economic differences were significant pieces of the larger puzzle of German unification. 
That Western affluence and Eastern destitution did not always fit together in an ideal 
manner likely helped reinforce the invisible divide that remains today. In fact, these 
divisions continue to manifest themselves in everyday German life—politically, 
economically, and socially. 
B. A WORLD WITHOUT A WALL—POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN 
GERMANY TODAY 
After the fall of the Third Reich, parties on the far right of the political spectrum 
remained dormant throughout Germany. However, the recent emergence of parties such as 
the AfD reveals a tangible unhappiness with the status quo. That the party enjoys 
significantly higher levels of popularity in the former GDR demonstrates large portions of 
East Germans feel some level of social and political marginalization. Reflecting on the 
twentieth anniversary of German unification, Jeffrey Anderson presents a grim picture: 
Germans appear to have arrived at a much more nuanced and far less 
euphoric conclusion about the state of union. Everywhere they look, they 
see a persistent East-West divide. In social relations, Eastern and 
Western Germans are separated to this day by the “wall in the head” 
(Mauer im Kopf). The economy is a tale of two Germanys, one rich and 
prosperous— the other essentially a ward of the state. And in the political 
realm, citizens and their representatives seem to operate within different 
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coordinate systems and seek to realize very different visions, depending 
on whether they hail from one side or the other of the former wall.34 
The roots of today’s political unhappiness can be traced back to the previously 
discussed social and economic divisions between residents of the former GDR and FRG. 
In fact, right-wing parties seized the opportunities provided by this unhappiness to make 
an almost immediate return to the political scene after reunification. As John Rodden notes: 
Particularly for Eastern German educators, the most unexpected and 
frightening development in the immediate aftermath of reunification was 
the increase of xenophobia, dramatically manifested in the growth of anti-
foreigner violence. Although the entire nation numbers no more than 50,000 
active neo-Nazis, right-wing political parties have exploited the continuing 
high unemployment rates and perceptions of ‘second-class’ status among 
Easterners. Polls show that only one-third of Eastern Germans consider 
Germany’s Western-style democracy ‘defensible’; right-wing parties have 
attracted up to 13 percent of the vote—and up to a third of all voters under 
30—in various eastern state elections since 1990. With a population only 
one quarter that of Western Germany (16 million v 65 million), Eastern 
Germany nevertheless harbors about 75 percent of the nation’s right-wing 
radicals.35 
While numerous right-wing parties have come and gone in the decades following 
unification, the present iteration—the AfD—has reached a level of popularity not achieved 
by any of its predecessors. The party first participated in elections in 2013, and 
subsequently received 4.7 percent of the popular vote.36 In a trend which would continue 
through the most recent elections, the party was most popular in regions which formerly 
fell within the borders of the GDR. In the 2017 general election, the party won 12.6 percent 
of the popular vote—becoming the third-largest party in the Bundestag.37 While the AfD 
did perform well in some regions of the former FRG, the fact that it remains so 
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disproportionately strong in the former GDR should not be discounted. This popularity 
discrepancy is likely due to a multitude of factors, as Berning notes:  
The regional divide in AfD support is more than obvious. The AfD’s 
heartland is Eastern Germany, while it also did very well in some areas 
of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. The AfD performed so strongly in 
Eastern Germany due to a combination of attitudinal resentments, socio-
demographic composition and structural factors.38 
Economically, the disparity between the former ideological rivals in the GDR and 
FRG remains strong. Unfortunately, it appears that over two decades of capitalism simply 
has not provided the economic windfall to Eastern Germany that many predicted 
unification would provide. As Anderson observed of the former GDR in 2010: 
The region remains a net exporter of inhabitants; since 1991, 
approximately 1.1 million people (almost 6.5 percent of the original East 
German population) have left for Western Germany. After making up 
considerable ground in the early years after unification, labor 
productivity languishes at around 70 percent of the Western German 
average. Unemployment rates are twice those registered in the West.39 
Gideon Becker traces the roots of this inequality to the foundational economic 
principles of the formerly socialist GDR.40 He argues that wealth accumulation in the 
Second World was so difficult that private citizens rarely even sought the capitalist’s dream 
of fortune. The restrictions on ownership of private property and fixed wage levels helped 
to reinforce the unimportance of capitalist pursuits. As such, generation upon generation 
passed these economic beliefs on to their children, further reinforcing social norms which 
flew in the face of traditional Western visions of economic prosperity. Only now is the 
former GDR seeing a coming of age of a generation that has lived its entire life under 
capitalism, so perhaps there is some chance for future optimism. 
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In fact, despite lagging behind Western Germany in many economic indicators, 
Eastern Germany should be applauded for its efforts to lead German efforts in a few key 
areas. One of key components of the Democracy Now platform during its campaign to 
banish the authoritarian GDR government from Berlin was the protection of the 
environment from the destructive forces of industrialism.41 The principle of environmental 
protection has endured, and now the region leads German efforts on environmental security 
and renewable energy efforts.42 Anderson also points to the growing economic might of 
Dresden, Leipzig, and the Berlin-Brandenburg ring as reasons to hope that the East is 
beginning to gain some economic momentum 
C. CONCLUSION 
The societal divisions between East and West continue to manifest themselves both 
politically and economically. In his assessment of the wealth disparity within Germany, 
Gideon Becker found that “vastly different living conditions between East and West 
Germany still remain. This is particularly true for the distribution of net wealth which 
is of special importance for the well-being of individuals.”43 Jeffrey Anderson adds that 
when looking back on German unification “the dominant impression is naturally one of 
shortfall, even failure, whether the metric is economic, political, or even moral.”44 For the 
foreseeable future, Germany will continue to be challenged to address the East-West 
fractures existing within its own borders. Sutton and Rookwood “suggest that in the future, 
the experience of further equity in socio-political terms would help reduce the prevailing 
cultural differences (and related sense of injustice) between the two.”45 
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Overcoming these differences will surely be difficult, but it will not be impossible. 
Perhaps sport will provide an avenue for bridging the social divides that remain between 
the two sides. Soccer, unquestionably the most popular sport in Germany, is uniquely 
positioned to assist in that realm. In fact, Sussmuth, Heyne, and Maenning argue that events 
such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup, which was held in Germany, appreciably helped to 
further a common German identity, bringing East and West closer together.46 However, 
the East-West gulf has permeated even the soccer pitch, making that unifying ability 
significantly weaker than if the field were leveled across Germany. 
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III. ROTTEN ROOTS: THE DECIMATION OF SOCCER IN THE 
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
The second-rate nature of East German soccer has its roots in the policies and 
actions of the GDR. The government there utilized sport for international acclaim, but its 
focus seemed to be on individual events, and thus soccer took a back seat to such events as 
weightlifting. Domestically, the sport was subject to political manipulation, erasing the 
suspense—and the resultant feelings of agony and joy—that a truly open competition can 
bring. The opportunity to invigorate an attentive population was squandered by decisions 
made off of the pitch, outside of competition, which impacted the product on the field. This 
chapter demonstrates the practices and policies implemented during the socialist GDR’s 
existence which formed the foundation for today’s fractured state of soccer in Germany. 
While the GDR was struggling to gain international recognition in the decade 
following its inception, it was sport that helped the socialist nation achieve symbolic 
acceptance in the eyes of the world. Following the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, 
the GDR’s National Olympic Committee was accepted by the International Olympic 
Committee as a member organization, paving the way for athletes to compete under the 
GDR’s flag at the 1972 Games—which were to be held in Munich.47 The GDR would 
arrive on the international sporting scene at one of the world’s most prominent sporting 
events. That these events were to be held in the capitalist FRG was a symbolic opportunity 
that was not lost on the GDR’s leadership, which placed a special emphasis on succeeding 
at the Munich games. These efforts paid off, as GDR athletes brought home the third-
largest haul of medals, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. With this event, 
Hesselmann and Ide argue that sport brought the GDR international recognition and thus 
became an integral part of East German identity.48 Riordan echoes those claims, remarking 
that international sporting success helped the government emerge from political darkness 
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and improved the recognition, credibility, and influence of the socialist government both 
domestically and internationally.49 
In pursuit of athletic glory, the GDR’s ministry of sport found it much easier to set 
the conditions of success in individual events. These events largely provided greater 
opportunity for doping, steroid use, and other forms of manipulation than team-based 
sports which relied not only on athletic prowess but also upon skill and teamwork—
attributes which cannot be intravenously introduced to competitors via needle.50 These 
individual successes did prove to be “an important element in cultivating the national 
consciousness through the construction of traditions and symbols” which helped to rally 
the citizenry behind their East German identity.51 In fact, the socialist government—always 
in search of heroes from the proletariat—frequently elevated successful members of the 
working class to the pantheon of national heroes. One of the most prominent examples of 
this adoration is the case of Gustav-Adolf “Täve” Schur, a cyclist who won multiple 
cycling championships in the 1950s.52 Schur’s “working-class roots, steadfastness, and 
political participation” made him the ideal subject of the socialist society, and he was 
held up as an example for all of his fellow countrymen to emulate.53 Schur became 
such a beloved figure that he was able to remain popular even after the GDR collapsed 
decades later. 
On the soccer pitch, the GDR found only fleeting success, despite the opportunity 
the game provides to unite the working class—that key cog of socialism’s success. As 
Markovits and Hellerman argue, “In every country where soccer developed into the 
premier occupant of the country’s sport space, the game became inextricably identified 
with a ‘proletarian’ culture.”54 The game had occupied that preeminent position in 
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Germany prior to World War II, yet that momentum was squandered by political meddling. 
Throughout the GDR’s existence, only one East German club, FC Magdeburg in 1974, 
ever won the prestigious European Cup—a competition held among the top clubs from 
throughout European domestic soccer leagues.55 Yet, that championship, which should 
have provided a major boon for soccer in the GDR, was characteristically bungled by the 
government. Fans of the team who had celebrated the achievement in the moment and 
likely could hardly wait to read about it in the next day’s paper were greeted instead with 
a politically-dictated headline.56 The “Heroes of Rotterdam,” as the Magdeburg players 
became known, were absent from the front page. Instead, the paper celebrated the 
29th anniversary of the Day of Liberation by featuring photographs and stories of party 
leadership at a Soviet monument in Berlin.57 The momentum of one of East Germany’s 
greatest soccer achievements was squandered mere hours after it occurred. 
A. SOCCER IN THE GDR: MEDDLING AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
That individual athletic achievements often overshadowed those of GDR team 
events should not suggest that the government did not attempt to manipulate those sports 
as well. However, in stark contrast with the achievements in individual competitions, the 
attempts at engineering success in team sports, and particularly soccer, were often 
unsuccessful. In fact, these efforts often proved detrimental to the success of soccer in the 
GDR by alienating large swaths of the population and depriving the system of potential 
players for development—obviously a necessary component of any successful soccer 
program. Manfred Ewald, a key figure in the successful development and of East German 
athletes participating in individual sports, “attributed the mediocrity of GDR football to 
undue interference by political and economic functionaries at both central and regional 
level, an opinion which was shared by the DFV.”58 
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It was the nature of socialist regime to attempt infiltration into every aspect of life 
in the GDR, and soccer was no different.59 Political manipulation occurred throughout the 
game, and even the names of clubs were subject to reconfiguration. As Dennis describes:  
in accordance with notions of socialist sport culture and the primacy of 
the collective, teams like Zwickau received a prefix, the most common 
one being BSG (Betriebssportgemeinschaft—enterprise sports group), 
and linkage to an economic sector was underpinned by the renaming of 
clubs. Thus, “Chemie,” “Lokomotive” and “Stahl” denoted the chemical 
industry, the railways and the steel industry respectively. The term 
“Dynamo” was associated with the Ministries of State Security and the 
Interior and “Vorwärts” with the army.60  
Thus, supporters who arrived to the stands to cheer on their favorite team now found 
themselves cheering for teams that hearkened back not to the sense of local identity and 
pride, which was rooted in generations of familial existence in a place, but rather to a 
political system that some citizens still regarded as alien and imposed.61 As a result, faced 
with the choice of cheering for a politicized product on the pitch or abstention, many 
would-be fans simply stayed away from the game. The complete disregard for significance 
of soccer’s cultural history torpedoed most of the opportunities for wide-spread success of 
the game.  
In addition to renaming clubs, most of their prior successes were forcibly 
abandoned as well in attempts to remove any connections to the perceived evils of a 
bourgeois past.62 VfB Leipzig, proud champions of Germany’s first soccer championship 
in 1903, lost this title in an attempt to erase a history that the socialists proclaimed never 
happened. As part of the same effort, Dresdner SC similarly was forced to abandon its 
back-to-back championships in 1943 and 1944, the last two titles of the war era. As 
Hesselmann and Ide succinctly summarize, “identification with the local football club, the 
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traditional basis of all football supporting, was not made easy in the days of the GDR 
Oberliga.”63 
The political infiltration of the game did not stop with simply renaming teams and 
stripping them of their heritage. The structure of the Oberliga’s governing body was 
frequently overhauled as the government worked on tightening its control of the game.64 
These controls were sometimes aimed at improving the performance on the field, but were 
more frequently designed to limit actions on the periphery such as regulation of supporter 
groups and crackdowns on decidedly anti-socialist illicit payment of players.65 There were 
also great lengths taken to ensure no significant talent drain the limited supply of quality 
players available within the GDR. As was the case with ordinary citizens, the emigration 
of soccer players was strictly forbidden and their actions were closely monitored. However, 
while ordinary citizens could be forcibly held in place, the soccer team was occasionally 
afforded the opportunity to travel abroad to participate in international competitions. As 
such, the state security apparatus developed an extensive program of control to ensure 
players did not attempt to flee to the capitalist west.66  
Anderson details the questionable case of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German soccer 
player who defected to the FRG in the 1980s and died shortly thereafter.67 During a trial 
for an unrelated crime in 2010, Karl-Heinz Felgner, a title-winning former East German 
boxer, claimed that after Eigendorf fled to the West that he (Felgner) had crossed into the 
FRG with orders from the Stasi to execute Eigendorf. Eigendorf died in an automobile 
accident with a significant amount of alcohol in his blood, but the amount of information 
available on his defection in Stasi files uncovered after German unification has led many 
to theorize that the Stasi may have played a role in his death. Either way, the effort exerted 
toward keeping Eigendorf and other East German soccer players behind the Iron Curtain 
demonstrates the socialist regime’s commitment to avoiding political embarrassment. The 
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GDR’s government clearly understood that a mass migration of soccer talent could have 
the effect of catalyzing exit attempts of many other citizens. The government’s influence, 
however, did not stop at simply restricting the emigration of players from East Germany. 
The Stasi in fact became so embroiled in the governance of German soccer that they began 
actively conspiring to ensure the success of the leadership’s favorite clubs. 
B. BFC DYNAMO: DARLING OF THE STASI 
Perhaps no soccer club embodied the interconnected nature of state and society 
better than Berlin Football Club (BFC) Dynamo. Erich Mielke, the Minister of State 
Security, made this club his personal project. Mielke went to great lengths to ensure the 
superiority of the team, as he intended to use the club to “highlight even more clearly the 
superiority of our socialist order in the area of sport.”68 Seeking a Berlin-based team to 
rival Hertha Berlin in the West, Mielke uprooted SC Dynamo Dresden in 1954 and declared 
the club would now be based in Berlin and called SC Dynamo Berlin, the name it retained 
for a decade before switching to the BFC Dynamo moniker. Despite protests from Dresden 
representatives, who appealed to First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, the powerful secret police 
chief prevailed, and the club relocated without any significant challenge.69  
After securing his team in the capital, Mielke went about ensuring its success on 
the pitch. He frequently intervened on personnel matters related to the club, forcing 
transfers of top-flight players to the club and ridding the roster of those who were past their 
prime.70 These policies appeared to have their intended impact, at least within the domestic 
league. Following Dynamo Dresden’s championship in 1978, BFC Dynamo went on to 
win the next eight championships with relative ease.71 In fact, during Dresden’s 
celebrations in 1978, Ulbricht is alleged to have entered the locker room to tell the players 
that the time had come for BFC to ascend to the top of the league. In addition to the forced 
transfers of players, Mielke also used his influence to gain favor with the officiating corps 
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of the Oberliga. Stasi-linked referees were used for most games of consequence; not 
surprisingly, many questionable decisions went BFC Dynamo’s way at the end of 
tight matches.72 As a result, BFC Dynamo became perhaps the most hated team in the 
Oberliga among rival clubs. It was during BFC Dynamo’s matches that the most significant 
levels of protest emerged, and arrests were always higher than during matches involving 
other clubs.73 
C. DISGUST AND DISSENT: THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC PROTESTS 
By the 1980s, the regime’s totalitarian grip on society began to loosen and soccer 
fans began to express their displeasure with the political interference in the beautiful game. 
Although there are notable events of violent opposition to state interference prior to the 
1980s, those events were usually one-off occurrences and did not become commonplace 
until the GDR’s waning decade. As Dennis notes, “club officials and supporters objected 
bitterly to politically-inspired discrimination against their own team; and by the 1980s 
hooliganism poised a growing threat to public order.”74 In a system built on regulation, any 
popular expression of discontent was a direct threat to the state’s survival. In order to 
counter this threat, the state tried to infiltrate supporter groups in order to intimidate, 
isolate, and eventually remove dissidents from the groups. Union Berlin, the rival club of 
Mielke’s beloved BFC Dynamo, created a natural cross-town rival for anti-state protestors 
to support.75 As such, the Union fans often rioted, especially during the Berlin derbies 
against BFC Dynamo. The Stasi attempted to infiltrate the Union Ultras but in perhaps a 
sign of their declining power, they were unable to make any significant impact on the 
group’s behavior. 
 
                                                 
72 Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,”212. 
73 Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 53–55. 
74 Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 209. 
75 Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 214. 
26 
The 1980s also saw an emergence of a “more militant, openly racist” skinhead 
culture among some supporter groups.76 This was a phenomenon not confined to Germany, 
as skinheads began to similarly appear in supporter groups in England and elsewhere in 
Europe.77 In Germany, however, this development was obviously troubling from a 
historical standpoint, but it also introduced more politically-charged violence into the realm 
of sport. Stasi documents reveal numerous arrests for fans who chanted anti-Semitic and 
xenophobic phrases such as “‘Jewish pigs’, ‘Berlin Jews’, and ‘leaders of Turks’” at 
opposing teams and players.78 One Berlin supporter group, Berlin Anale, openly embraced 
fascism and in August 1985 they took part in major brawls in the city of Dresden while 
singing “My father was an SS-soldier” and other traditional fascist songs.79 Dennis reveals 
the lack of control that the state was able to maintain over soccer supporters: 
These incidents testify to the overall failure to suppress the hooligan 
element by the deployment of more informers, the segregation of fans, 
restrictions on the sale of alcohol, fines and arrests. 960 disturbances 
were recorded in the 1986–87 season and 1,099 in the following year. In 
the latter period, more than half of the offences were committed by Halle, 
Union Berlin, Rostock and Erfurt fans. Magdeburg and Dynamo Dresden 
lagged some way behind. These figures should be regarded as indicative 
rather than definitive in what is a notoriously grey area. Numbers may 
well have been massaged before their dispatch to higher authorities and, 
furthermore, racist chants such as ‘Jewish pigs’, vandalism and many 
other incidents simply went unrecorded as stewards and police, whether 
in the grounds or outside, were sometimes overwhelmed by the sheer 
scale of disorder. A supporter of Chemie Leipzig recalls that the police 
hardly dared intervene when brawls broke out in the Georg-Schwarz-
Sportpark for fear of having thousands of spectators at their throats.80 
As German youth were continuing to find their political voice and express their will 
through violence and other means, the government remained in denial. Internal 
memorandums released after the collapse of the GDR show the government blamed the 
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root of violent hooliganism on the West, turning a blind eye to the true source of the 
discord. All of this occurred despite mounting evidence to the contrary, including more 
records which showed arrests for fans chanting “‘Stasi out!’ and ‘The fuzz are work-shy’” 
during games.81 
It seems the skinheads understood the recruitment opportunities afforded to them 
at soccer stadiums, for club matches became one of the most frequent meeting grounds of 
the outlawed groups.82 The groups often infiltrated the ranks of the GDR’s stewards—state-
designated personnel assigned to keep the peace. As disillusionment with the socialist state 
spread throughout society, the skinheads found it easier to have their men acting as the 
stewards who allowed or denied access to sporting matches and other public events. By 
controlling access, the skinheads were ensured that their access to popular meeting spots—
such as soccer matches—would not be revoked. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Cold War-era policies toward soccer within the GDR are at the root of the current 
poor state of soccer in East German. Soccer maintained its position as the most popular 
sport in East Germany throughout the existence of the GDR. But, as Hesselmann an Ide 
argue, “The communist leaders never really managed to develop a successful strategy for 
using that popularity for the national and socialist cause. East German football could have 
flourished…but the leaders continually alienated the supporters.”83 This alienation is 
perhaps similar to the marginalization felt today by East German soccer supporters whose 
teams struggle to compete in the Bundesliga’s top divisions. 
                                                 
81 Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 57. 
82 Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 61. 
83 Hesselmann and Ide, 40. 
28 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
29 
IV. FAILED RECOVERY: THE CONTINUED MALAISE OF 
EAST GERMAN SOCCER  
In today’s Germany, it appears that a significant portion of the population has cause 
to feel continued marginalization rooted in last century’s ideological Cold War. Although 
the physical barriers between East and West Germany were long ago removed, 
psychological barriers remain in place even today. East Germans remain economically 
behind their Western brethren. Significant political divisions can be observed. Socially, the 
country remains divided. These divisions are particularly prevalent on the pitch of 
Germany’s most popular sport—soccer. As part of the reunification process, the German 
Football Association (DFB) absorbed the East’s perceived lesser teams and proceeded to 
cleave them from the newly unified Bundesliga’s top ranks.84 Afterward, the association 
never truly embarked on a mission of leveling the playing field, despite a concerted 
campaign to improve player development in support of the national team. As a result, much 
of the country has lost an outlet for local pride and the chance to prove their mettle against 
the traditionally stronger teams from the West, despite consistent support of the game in 
the East. While the national teams were awaiting official unification, East German citizens 
took to the streets to celebrate West Germany’s 1990 World Cup victory as their own.85 In 
2006, East German cities were largely disregarded as potential hosts for World Cup games 
or peripheral events, despite an overwhelming willingness and desire to be involved.86 This 
loss of representation has likely helped to further the marginalization of East Germans, 
who have unfortunately sometimes turned to violence as a result.  
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A. CONTINUED POOR PERFORMANCE 
In the three decades following unification, economic and political disparities are 
not the only remaining signs of Germany’s internal division. On the soccer pitch, the East 
trails the West significantly in terms of both players and teams in Germany’s top division. 
The impact of policies in the GDR was certainly damaging to football during and 
immediately after the reign of communism, and the perceived lack of quality from the 
formerly socialist region’s players and squads is not unique to East Germany. Across 
Europe, no club from a nation that was formerly part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
(WTO) has won the UEFA Champions League or its predecessor, the European Cup, 
since Bucharest’s FCSB did so in 1986—while Nicolae Ceausescu was still the leader of 
socialist Romania. Internationally, the last significant victory from a WTO nation came in 
1976 when Czechoslovakia won the European Championship.87 None have ever lifted the 
FIFA World Cup.88 
The DFB, which absorbed the GDR’s clubs and players following unification, 
deserves its share of the blame for the post-unification discrepancies. While teams from 
West Germany were likely superior—the nation had, after all, just claimed the 1990 World 
Cup championship—it appears East German sides were’ not given a fair chance from the 
outset. As Frick and Prinz described the club integration into the Bundesliga, “following 
the unification of East Germany and West Germany, the first Bundesliga in 1991–1992 
was expanded to 20 teams to integrate the top two teams from the former first division in 
East Germany (Dynamo Dresden and Hansa Rostock).”89 That only 10 percent of the top 
flight was made up of teams from East Germany likely helped to perpetuate the quality 
discrepancy, as teams in the top league’s gain more access to money which they can 
reinvest to help ensure future quality at the club. 
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The disparity in representation which began in the 1991–92 season is still present 
and observable today, a testament to East German teams’ lack of ability to overcome 
the remaining obstacles to success. In the 2018–19 Bundesliga season, only one club, the 
internationally funded RB Leipzig, is participating in the Bundesliga’s top division.90 
The hope for future promotion is perhaps less bleak, with five clubs from the former 
GDR—FC Union Berlin, Dynamo Dresden, SSV Jahn Regensburg, FC Magdeburg, and 
FC Erzgebirge Aue—participating in the 18 team second division, from which the top three 
teams are promoted to the top flight at the end of each season.91 
The funding available to teams in the Bundesliga first division is a significant boon, 
for in the German system it is the local clubs that are often responsible for finding and 
developing local talent. Monetary issues have haunted East German teams since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, as many key East German players quickly orchestrated transfers to the 
more wealthy West German teams where they were able to obtain more lucrative contracts 
for their play.92 This flight of talent exacerbated the lack of East German top flight 
Bundesliga representation by draining clubs there of talent which may have helped to 
secure promotion at a time when the GDR’s development system appears to have been 
producing perhaps its finest crop of young talent. In fact, almost a third of the German 
national team was made up of East Germans as the millennium turned.93 Among these 
players who learned the fundamentals of the game as boys in the GDR were Matthias 
Sammer, the linchpin on Germany’s 1996 European Champion squad, and Michael 
Ballack, perhaps the most impactful player for Germany from 2002–2006. Sammer 
developed his game in the Dynamo Dresden youth system and Ballack was born in the East 
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German region of Saxony.94 Yet after that heyday, representation by East German players 
quickly waned and the two most recent World Cup squads, the 2014 and 2018 editions, 
featured just one player who was born in the East. Hesselmann and Ide point to the nexus 
of the current development problems: “The reason for this is simple. In order to survive in 
the short term, [East German clubs] buy mediocre but experienced foreign players rather 
than take the risk of training and fielding their own youngsters.” 
It appears the DFB missed a major opportunity to grow the game in the East when, 
after a disastrous European Championship campaign in 2000, the nation’s collective 
football organizations began a complete overhaul of the German youth development 
system aimed at ensuring future success. The Bundesliga implemented a policy which 
required top tier teams to provide football development academies to help develop young 
players both athletically and academically. As Price describes, “The provisos laid down in 
the licensing from the sporting, medical, and pedagogical fields, combined with a unique 
philosophy for every academy, guarantee an integral education of young players–and 
ensure that these youngsters also have a future outside of football.”95 Today this 
development process is spurred by 36 of these so-called elite academies, of which only 
eight are in the former GDR.96 
In addition to the collapse of the talent development infrastructure, supporters of 
teams from the former GDR struggled with their identities following unification. As Braun 
notes, fans of the Stasi-run BFC Dynamo struggled with the best means to honor the club’s 
storied yet checkered past: 
In face of that image the BFC quickly tried to get rid of all symbols of 
the past after the fall of the wall. The club was in 1990 renamed in “FC 
Berlin.” Yet the club never could repeat its success and got stuck in the 
regional league. But in 1999 there was a change of mind: the officials 
decided that taking the emergency exit out of the club’s history perhaps 
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had been a bit overhasty—and so the old name Dynamo was adopted 
again. 125 out of 135 possible votes followed this decision, there was 
cheering in the club house when the result was announced. Jürgen Bogs, 
a former coach, commented: “We did achieve a lot back then and should 
stick to this tradition.” But a new discussion about the club’s 
controversial past was just around the corner: It started when in 2005 
Dynamo requested to decorate its jerseys with three stars—an honor 
reserved for those clubs who held a perennial championship. Up to then 
only the FC Bayern München was granted the privilege of wearing the 
stars. But the German Football League refused Dynamo’s demand, 
arguing that only championships after the introduction of the 
“Bundesliga” would count—a decision that excluded not only the West 
German champions prior to 1963 but also all East German champions. 
Although the League tried to assure the public that there had been no 
“political considerations,” an immediate storm of protest by East 
German fans moaned about a severe case of deception of the “East 
German people.” Even the press speculated that the crucial but not 
openly discussed point in the whole “Star Wars” affair had been the 
question if championships “gained with the assistance of the Ministry of 
State Security should be rewarded at all.”97 
Adding to the post-unification East-West divisions were some of the decisions 
made regarding the German-hosted 2006 World Cup. It appears that the East was ready to 
take on a greater role in showcasing Germany’s footballing resurgence but were denied 
the opportunity. As part of the month-long competition, only one city in East Germany, 
Potsdam, was selected as a base for a competing national team and only one city, Leipzig, 
was granted the opportunity to host a match.98 This dearth of East German presence in the 
world’s premiere soccer competition was not due to a lack of interest. Among the towns 
vying to host squads during the competition was Neuruppin—a beautiful lake-side town 
with a world class hotel located near enough to Berlin to make it a seemingly perfect 
candidate.  
Yet, the Neuruppiners, like most of their neighbors in the East, were not afforded 
the opportunity to showcase themselves. Perhaps the fact that half of the country was absent 
from the game’s biggest stage, coupled with a complicated footballing past and lack of 
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modern player development have continued to fuel the downtrodden state of the game in 
the former GDR. After failing to emerge out of the opening group stage of the 2018 World 
Cup, the DFB will likely turn its eye again to the domestic youth development machine. 
There are opportunities to bring more East German quality into the fold by improving the 
long-neglected youth infrastructure there. An integration of a higher quantity of quality 
East German players could help the German squad’s performance on the pitch and the 
German social predicament off of it. 
B. RACISM AND THE FAR RIGHT 
Unfortunately, the fall of the Berlin Wall did not bring an end to the violence which 
sometimes accompanied play on the pitch during the life-span of the GDR. Hooliganism 
accompanies soccer fandom across Europe, Germany is certainly not alone in that realm.99 
The aforementioned decrepit state of the game in East Germany has continued to support 
feelings of marginalization amongst club supporters there. Fanning the flames, the tight-
knit nature of the groups makes them ripe for the spread of extremist views, and there is 
evidence that some Ultra groups openly support Nazism.100 The club Dynamo Dresden is 
known more for its violent and racist fan sections than for its success on the field.101 The 
group is frequently involved in clashes with police and rival fan groups, and they are known 
to deliver racist chants during games and they have even garnered the nickname “Fist of 
the East” as a testament to their violent nature.102  
Germany’s recent struggles—along with its fellow European Union member 
states—in dealing with Europe’s migrant crisis have done nothing to assuage the white 
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supremacist views of some soccer supporters.103 As a result, some organized supporter 
groups have spawned sinister splinter cells. In the town of Freital, “what started out as a 
loose association of far-right activists, football hooligans, and hate-filled anti-migrant 
Facebook groups soon spawned a terror organization.”104 In Cologne, “right-wingers and 
soccer hooligans banded together…and overran police officers in violent protests they said 
were aimed at Islamic extremism.”105 The influx of migrants, and other factors, have helped 
fuel political resurgence of far-right parties in Germany. The reemergence of legitimate 
far-right political groups may also be inciting those on the extremes as well. In a 2017 
international match in Prague against the Czech Republic, German supporters belted out 
Nazi chants throughout the game, even interrupting a designated moment of silence.106 The 
fans also jeered during both national anthems, prompting rebuffs from team management 
and the German squad itself.  
As these incidents of racism continue to flare up, the German soccer system may 
provide fuel for those xenophobic citizens who let their hatred of outsiders guide political 
decisions. The Bundesliga has increasingly become a proving ground for international 
players, as the number of non-Germans on top flight teams skyrocketed from just 
17 percent in 1993–94 to 49 percent in the 2003–04 season.107 As Germany continues to 
take on migrants from war-torn regions, those displaced youth will continue to seek ways 
to assimilate into German society. Sport, as argued by Dirk Halm, provides a unique 
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opportunity for multi-cultural youth to interact and integrate with each other.108 Yet there 
are a fixed number of positions on the field and thus any player given a first team 
assignment will likely leave another on the bench pining for an opportunity. If the player 
left behind is a citizen with multiple generations of German ancestors, there is another 
opening for a feeling of marginalization to creep in. Here again, soccer provides an 
opportunity to both integrate and incense. 
Most recently, following the 2018 World Cup, Mesut Özil, a key player on the 
German national team who happens to be of Turkish descent, retired from the national team 
as a result of racist attacks aimed at him. Özil controversially posted an image to social 
media of himself with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the months leading up 
to the tournament, and he was subject to heavy criticism from the media and the public at 
large.109 In his retirement announcement, Özil described the difficulties associated with his 
Turkish ancestry and his German identity: 
In the eyes of [DFB President Reinhard] Grindel and his supporters, I am 
German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose. This is 
because despite paying taxes in Germany, donating facilities to German 
schools, and winning the World Cup with Germany in 2014, I am still 
not accepted into society. I am treated as being “different.” I received the 
“Bambi Award” in 2010 as an example of successful integration into 
German society, I received a “Silver Laurel Leaf” in 2014 from the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and I was a “German Football 
Ambassador” in 2015. But clearly, I am not German…? Are there criteria 
for being fully German that I do not fit? My friend Lukas Podolski and 
Miroslav Klose are never referred to as German-Polish so why am I 
German-Turkish? Is it because it is Turkey? Is it because I’m a Muslim? 
I think here lays an important issue. By being referred to as German-
Turkish, it is already distinguishing people who have family from more 
than one country. I was born and educated in Germany, so why don’t 
people accept that I am German? ... 
It is with a heavy heart and after much consideration that because of 
recent events, I will no longer be playing for Germany at international 
level whilst I have this feeling of racism and disrespect. I used to wear 
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the German shirt with such pride and excitement, but now I don’t. This 
decision has been extremely difficult to make because I have always 
given everything for my teammates, the coaching staff and the good 
people of Germany. But when high-ranking DFB officials treat me as 
they did, disrespect my Turkish roots and selfishly turn me into political 
propaganda, then enough is enough. That is not why I play football, and 
I will not sit back down and do nothing about it. Racism should never, 
ever be accepted.110 
Schiller argues that although throughout Özil’s international career his dedication 
to the German team has been unquestionable and unwavering, his unique situation details 
the extent to which non-German cultures are resisted in Germany today.111 Özil, a German 
by birth who renounced his Turkish citizenship well before it was required by law, was 
accepted because he integrated himself into German culture, instead of having his culture 
integrated into Germany. As Schiller remarked in 2014, “in line with current policies and 
those of national governments in the recent past this does not imply that all cultures are 
valued equally but prioritizes assimilation into German culture and suggests no more than 
cultural peculiarities are tolerated as long as they do not threaten the predominance of 
German culture.”112  
C. CONCLUSION 
In Germany, soccer-related turmoil today remains prevalent and pertinent. The 
East-West gulf in performance on the pitch and development of players off of it remains 
vast. On top of the feelings of inadequacy compared to their Western counterparts, would-
be East German soccer players are now also faced with competition from Germany’s 
migrant population. This migrant population is also a target of right-wing populist rhetoric, 
perhaps indicating that the popularity of the AfD in the former GDR is not a complete 
surprise.113 To this end, the DFB faces an uphill battle if it decides to undertake a program 
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aimed at leveling the playing field across Germany. Yet Germany itself provided the 
blueprint for developmental overhaul less than two decades ago. If the association sets in 
motion another program of reform as a result of the unacceptable exit at the 2018 World 
Cup, Germany may have an avenue to better incorporate both the soccer-dejected 











Soccer is not only better than real life, but able to drag real life with it to 
a better place.114 
—Daniel Harris, July 13, 2018 
Soccer maintains a prominent position in the German social landscape. As such, 
the game’s impact on German life, including the political realm, is likely to remain 
significant for the foreseeable future. While the game retains its place as the most popular 
sport throughout Germany, the quality of the product on East German pitches continues to 
lag behind the Western product and the development systems meant for East German 
players remain woefully inept. Unfortunately, the chasm on the soccer pitch is just part of 
a larger set inequality that continues to divide the former GDR and FRG. Lingering 
economic differences have created significant wealth disparities between West and East.115 
Politically, right-wing populist parties have consistently been more popular in the former 
GDR, where politicians are able to capitalize on messages emphasizing the voice of “the 
pure people” who have been marginalized at the hands of “the corrupt elite.”116 On the 
soccer pitch, populists have found fuel for their xenophobia as immigrants are participating 
in the German developmental system in greater numbers—drawing the ire of racist fans 
who feel that “native Germans,” a term usually defined in neo Nazi terms, are being left 
behind.117 
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When one considers the evolution of German nationalism, sports and nationalism 
were joined from the early 19th century and without pause until today. Ergo, the purpose 
of this examination of sport at a time of renationalization in Europe which is bringing about 
serious implications for the role of the U.S. in European security. Since 1945, soccer and 
politics have been intertwined in the Germany’s return to the rank of the nations and as 
means to channel energies that formerly ended in armed conflict into a peaceful Europe. 
When the FRG won the 1954 World Cup—a victory dubbed The Miracle of Bern—it 
signified “something like a re-entry into the world” for the nation which was still 
recovering from a half-century of war and devastation.118 That championship was of such 
importance that “the World Cup title of 1954 is an indelible part of postwar federal German 
democracy’s success story.”119 Bern became a victory for West Germany in the system of 
the cold war, where German-German hostility was uppermost.  
Likewise, the leadership of the GDR understood that sporting success would lead 
to international recognition and they sought about attempting systematic manipulation of 
sport to meet their political aims.120 If anything, in the GDR, sport and nationalism 
exceeded the pinnacle achieved in Nazi Germany and surely in the Bonn Republic. 
Together with the armed forces, organized sports in the SED state manifested a political 
prestige and organizational refinement as found in few other nations throughout history.  
Following unification in 1990, the 2006 World Cup—hosted in Germany—became 
a symbolic opportunity for all of Germany to prove itself while in the international 
limelight.121 The World Cup allowed Germans to be proud of themselves and their country; 
that is, to show a nationalism of a post modern and friendly kind, which had especially 
been eschewed in the old FRG as dubious.122 While soccer and politics intersect in 
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countries across the globe, the game maintains an important place in a German state and 
society that in 2018 is undergoing a sharp renationalization the contours of which are not 
wholly clear. As Pyta describes: 
German football has a very special attribute that has helped its 
development into a major cultural phenomenon: the capacity to have 
symbolic meanings. Symbols play a decisive role in constructing 
communities. They enrich the interpretation of behavior patterns with a 
degree of aesthetic condensation that facilitates the communication of 
share cultural contents. Symbols act as perceivable expressions of those 
cultural dispositions that circulate in communities. The development of 
a long-lasting collective identity is not possible without the use of 
symbols, which form shared meanings and values and provide it with 
vital visibility. Germany is probably the only country in Europe where 
football has managed to gain symbolic qualities in such great measure. 
The reason for this is the exceptional situation after the Second World 
War that left Germany in a situation of such symbolic devastation that 
football could fill the gap.123 
The lack of East German representation by either clubs in the top tiers of the 
Bundesliga or players on the National Team may seem insignificant to an outsider ignorant 
of German history, society, and culture, but when coupled with the other areas in which 
East trails West, it becomes part of a legend of how the East has been wronged, a 
phenomenon which in 2018 in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis has exploded in violence. 
It is this tale that continues to allow right-wing populists to maintain levels of support in 
the East, while such political movements are also taking hold in the West, although without 
quite the phenomena as seen in Saxony since 2013. 
These divisions allow the populist discourse to focus on the divisions within 
German society, evolving ultimately into an “us versus them” situation which, the populists 
believe, can only be remedied through the implementation of nationalist and neo Nazi 
racial policies wholly at odds with the German Basic Law.124 Soccer supporter groups fit 
into this puzzle in that they are uniquely organized to support collective political action. 
Right-wing groups have found supporter associations to be prime opportunities for drawing 
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impressionable youth to their cause.125 Some fans of East German clubs which are 
struggling to compete in the upper echelons of German soccer have come to collectively 
identify themselves as a group which has been left behind by a German society after unity 
and the Hartz IV social welfare reforms where the winners in Munich, Stuttgart, or Silicon 
Valley take all, and those clinging to dignity and social status are threatened now by 
refugees in their number. This tight-knit network of supporters lends itself to social 
cohesion, and perhaps ultimately collective political action.126 Indeed, these types of 
cohesive social networks, as Della Porta argues, “account for the adhesion of a large share 
(60 to 90 percent) of members of various religious and political organizations.”127 From 
these collective identities and social exclusion, protest can emerge if the perceived or actual 
slights are nurtured within the group for a significant amount of time.128 In fact, Germany—
along with much of Europe—has been forced to deal with hooliganism among fans for 
many decades. Hooliganism is unsurprisingly present in East Germany, where clubs such 
as Dynamo Dresden have gained reputations for the oftentimes racist, sometimes violent 
nature of their supporter sections.129 
Yet despite the concerns related to the popularity of nationalist parties in East 
Germany and the enduring economic and social divisions between the former GDR and 
FRG, there may be reason for hope on the horizon. While most Germans likely consider 
the 2018 World Cup result unacceptable—the squad crashed out in the group stage, 
Germany’s worst finish ever—the early exit may provide an opportunity to once again 
revamp the nation’s soccer system. After all, it was Germany that set the world standard 
for recovery from seemingly disastrous international results when it set in motion the 
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famous ten-year plan after the 2000 European Championship.130 If the DFB were to 
reinvigorate that plan and in this iteration place real effort into developing the game in East 
Germany, an area which was not a significant part of the post-2000 plan, perhaps it would 
yield results beneficial to Germany on and off of the soccer pitch. Germany, and indeed all 
of Europe, continues to struggle with renationalization and centrifugal forces poised to 
undermine or destroy the European Union, diversification of the continental population 
through an influx of migrants, and economic challenges brought about by multi-national 
interests within the European Union. As such, Germany must work on all fronts to preserve 
its own stability domestically and internationally so that it can continue to be a credible 
leader in Europe. Soccer certainly will not cure all of that ails German society and 
developing players in the East alone would not result in the defeat of populism there. 
However, based on the game’s cultural importance, leveling the playing field to support 
greater East German participation in the Bundesliga’s top divisions may at least provide 
hope for citizens of the former GDR by allowing them to escape from the economic and 
political realities of daily life—if only for the two joyous hours per week, when their 
favorite teams are in action. 
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